More fallout from the Report

Hey folks, just keeping it real in the field--out in Baghdad, Iraq, where in the mornings now it's actually pleasant and in the afternoons it's about as hot as it is at home on a hot summer day. In short, It has gotten pretty livable here.

I have been doing a little more reading this week--not reading the report from GEN Petraeus so much as reading some analysis done prior to the delivery of his report. I read another short paper from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (www.csis.org) regarding the effort over here. The title sums up the writer's thesis:

"America's Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq's Real Needs"

It is yet another short, fascinating analysis of the war done by CSIS. The first sentence should be read by every news anchor in the "Liberal News Media" before each story on the war: "America has no good options in Iraq, and the odds of any form of enduring success are even at best." The author, Anthony Cordesman, goes on to add what I think is the seminal point that the conservatives AND the liberals are really missing: that we have a moral obligation to take responsibility for what has happened here. Those who say that the "surge is working" and those who want immediate withdrawal are both failing to acknowledge that this is no longer an experiment in democracy, no political science class practical-exercise. There has been a huge amount of carnage and destruction here on the human side that we as a nation are morally accountable for. I never voted for The Decider, but enough people did that we now have this train wreck on our hands. We all have to come together to solve it.

As a logistician over here, I can tell you he is right on point when he enumerates the challenges of withdrawal. He also points out that we do not control the battlefield--in other words, there may be a time where we are forced out at a time not of our own choosing. In my opinion, when we decide to leave, the items that require the most effort to evacuate out of here are what the Army calls "major-end items;" i.e., trucks, tanks, MRAPs, weapons systems, etc. They obviously need to be some of the last things to leave with any unit that rolls out of here. If we take most of the usable major end items, demilitarize or destroy the ones that we don't want, and sell the remainder to the central government we should be pretty happy. They facilities here are no great shakes, but we need to stop using temporary solutions for them and start building lasting infrastructure that can be turned over to the Iraqis. Our failure to address the needs of the people has so embittered segments of the population towards us that some of this stuff might get destroyed anyway. I've said before that some of the mistakes here just can't be undone. Mr. Cordesman writes that the ideological nightmare of half-formed plans and the incompetence of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the beginning are two of the crucial early issues that have shaped the present situation.

Another interesting point Cordesman brings up is the situation in the southeastern part of the country. There was no surge there. The surge was mainly in Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala. The British were the primary force down south until recently; now the Shi'ite militias are in control. 30% of the country's population and 80% of the oil exports are down there. The oil constitutes 90-95% of the entire government revenues, and this asset is in the hands of rival Shi'ite factions. Question: What do you think they are doing with the money? Hmm. Another interesting fact is that numerous factions are being supported by Iran, presumably because they are hedging their bets on who will come out on top. Furthermore, Iran is just as confused as we are about the alliances and loyalties of these groups. They are not controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr, or the government of al-Maliki, or the Iranians for that matter. A lot of the factions are criminal enterprises.

I'm getting worn down by all this. It's like reading bad news every damn day. Is there room for optimism? Always. But realism needs to take hold in Washington, and I think that the question of how well the Iraqis can take over for us is summed up pretty well in Cordesman's report. The Iraqi Army is showing great promise, but we can't push too much onto them too soon or they'll cave. The regional police will end up being sectarian in composition in most places. And the national police "cannot be healed or reformed. They are a symbol of sectarian cleansing and Shi'ite abuse of Sunnis." Not a pretty picture. These NP's are infiltrated by the Shi'ite militias and just are useless.

I was going to post some pics, but the internet here has royally sucked for about three weeks, and stuff downloads and uploads so slowly that I don't have the patience. I have attempted to upload a picture for 20 solid minutes and...nothing. I'll try again next time.

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